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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).In 1952, under the guidance of Chairman Mao, China's central gov-
ernment established an epidemic prevention system that focused on
the principle of “putting prevention ﬁrst” [1]. This approach greatly
strengthened public health infrastructure and capacity in China. Chinese
society has changed dramatically over the last 60 years, characterized
by rapid economic and population growth. Intensiﬁcation of animal
production to accommodate population growth and increasingpersonal
wealth have driven what appears to be a seemingly unceasing series of
emerging infectious disease (EID) events [2]. The emergence of pan-
demic strains of inﬂuenza fromhigh risk areas of China seems an almost
seasonal occurrence and, in thewake of this and a number of other glob-
ally important public health emergencies, China is moving from a pas-
sive approach to EID surveillance and response to a more proactive
one. This change has not occurred spontaneously; it is a process that
has occurred through a number of distinct stages. China, however, ap-
pears to be in a transitional period again.1. Maintaining social stability
At the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) out-
break, China's approach to EID surveillance was built on the principle
of “maintaining social stability”. Surveillance systems were predomi-
nantly passive and hysteresis. The 2003 SARS pandemic demonstratedial Work, Institute of Health
logy, Kelvin Grove, Brisbane
is is an open access article underclear weaknesses in this approach [3]. Government agencies were
stunned by the speed of disease transmission and the philosophy of
“maintaining social stability” produced conﬂict between science and
politics, obstructing the release of epidemic information. The ﬁrst case
of “atypical pneumonia” occurred in Guangdong province on November
16, 2002. The Chinese public (and international community) were,
however, not informed of developing events. This was resultant from
a combination of poor policy and poor management. The initial cases
of SARS occurred in Guangdong province, with the earliest case record-
ed to have occurred in Foshan city on November 16, 2002; this was
followed by index cases in Heyuan (December 10), Jiangmen (Decem-
ber 21), Zhongshan (December 26), Guangzhou (January 2, 2003),
Shenzhen (January 15) and Zhaoqing (January 17) [4]. Health ofﬁcials
in Guangdong province were, however, not required to notify the Min-
istry of Health of the emerging crisis. At the time, the provincial health
departments were only legally mandated to notify for these diseases
listed on National Infectious Disease Reporting System; as atypical
pneumonia was not listed notiﬁcation was not mandatory. Despite
this, it appears that authorities were notiﬁed and investigations were
conducted early in the outbreak [3]. The effectiveness of the response
was, however, hobbled by bureaucracy. A team of health experts was
sent toGuangzhou by theMinistry ofHealth on January 20, 2003 and a re-
port was produced and delivered to the provincial health bureau on Jan-
uary 27, 2003. This report was, however, marked “top secret” and it was
not read until three days after receipt as there was no ofﬁcial present
who was authorized to open the report [3]. Upon opening, the provincial
health bureau disseminated an alert to the hospitals. This act in itself was,
however, counterproductive; under the legislation of the time, untilthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
100 J. Lu et al. / One Health 2 (2016) 99–102announced by the Ministry of Health, the occurrence of an infectious dis-
ease outbreak was classiﬁed as a state secret [3]. This prohibition of
reporting/sharing of information resulted in the spread of rumors of circu-
lating anthrax, bird ﬂu or other diseases in the community.
Effectively the legislation that was designed to maintain social sta-
bility did the opposite; it created a bureaucracy that slowed response
and, through the lack of clear information and communication, created
fear and drove speculation. It was not until February 11, 2003 that the
Guangzhou Municipal Government and Guangdong Provincial Health
Department responded to these fears and held a press conference, at
which the public were informed that Guangdong province was free of
anthrax, the plague, and avian inﬂuenza. On February 18, 2003 the
China Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced Chla-
mydia to be the cause and provided authoritative instructions to hospi-
tals regarding treatment based on this. Over the next two months
ofﬁcial Government media reported cases to be increasing, but main-
tained their assertion that the outbreak was under control. The Chinese
government, however, continued to be resistant to transparency. Infor-
mation continued to be controlled and reportingwas again restricted on
February 23, 2003 in response to criticism to theGovernment's handling
of the outbreak. There was a clear political motive; restrictions on
reporting continued in the lead up to the March National People's Con-
gress [3]. On March 24, 2003 US CDC and Hong Kong scientists an-
nounced that a novel coronavirus had been isolated from samples and
proposed this to be the etiological agent. Despite this evidence, the Chi-
nese Government and CDCmaintained that Chlamydia was the cause of
the outbreak until as late as mid-April 2003; any dissenting voice was
silenced through procedure that required ﬁndings to be reported to
theMinistry of Health [5]. On April 16, 2003, theWHOdeclared the pre-
viously identiﬁed, novel coronavirus to be the etiological agent of SARS;
this was supported by studies that demonstrated the coronavirus to ful-
ﬁl Koch's postulates [6]. The WHO criticized reporting of SARS by the
Chinese Government and ﬁnally, on April 20, 2003 the Chinese govern-
ment complied with demands for complete, accurate and timely
reporting of SARS cases; up until this point, little information had
been shared with the WHO. The government reported that 339 con-
ﬁrmed cases and 402 suspected cases of SARS had occurred in Beijing,
contradicting the statement of Health Minister Zhang Wenkang only
days before, which reported only 22 conﬁrmed cases [7].
This lack of operational transparency fed rumors, speculation andmis-
information which were ampliﬁed by themedia; furthermore, it invoked
international fear and, in some cases resulted in inappropriate courses of
action being followed. Rather than maintaining stability, this approach
had the opposite effect [8]. To the credit of the Chinese government,
through much introspection, considerable reform to the public health
systemwasmade, including: the development of public health legislation
and regulations to improve government response; and transformation of
the Sanitation andAnti-epidemic Stations intoCenters forDisease Control
and Prevention with dramatically improved infrastructure and technical
capabilities. The SARS epidemic lead to a revolution in China's approach
to infectious disease surveillance and response. Emphasis was shifted
back to “Prevention First” and the utility of this approach improved
China's handling of a number of subsequent EID events, including:
H5N1 avian inﬂuenza, Streptococcus suis infections, severe fever with
thrombocytopenia syndrome virus, and the 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza pan-
demic. Despite the shift in approach, there were still concerns; the Chi-
nese Government appeared to conceal cases during the 2004 H5N1
outbreak and criticized publications that indicated otherwise [9].
2. Preserving local economic interests
There was, however, a divergence from this approach during the
2013 H7N9 avian inﬂuenza outbreak. Since 2004, China CDC has con-
ducted surveillance for pneumonia of unknown etiology. This system
conﬁrmed three human cases of inﬂuenza A (H7N9) on March 29,
2013 [10]. Health authorities responded aggressively with rapiddiagnosis and treatment, enacting a number of plans that had been de-
veloped in response to identiﬁcation of systematic failures during the
SARS outbreak; agricultural authorities culled sick birds and closed
live poultry markets; and, in contrast to the SARS outbreak, H7N9 epi-
demic information was published expediently and disease information
shared openly with the international community. The Chinese govern-
ment reported the outbreak to the WHO on March 31, 2013. These in-
terventions were effective and the process signiﬁcantly more
transparent than that of the SARS outbreak. However, this approach
came with a signiﬁcant economic cost. H7N9 was estimated to cost
the poultry industry ¥7.75 billion (US$1.24) in direct losses in the ﬁrst
three months alone [11]. The National Association of Poultry Industry
in China and some poultry enterprises jointly submitted appeals to
local governments in order to secure their economic interests. Unlike
H5N1, H7N9 does not cause overt signs among poultry and in addition
to industry concerns, Chinese agriculture authorities did not fully appre-
ciate the immediate threat posed. These concerns precipitated a less-
aggressive response to subsequent sporadic human cases and economic
preservationwas prioritized. Responsewas often limited to searches for
H7N9 affected birds in the immediate geographical regions associated
with human cases. As the birds were not obviously sick, mass euthana-
sia of poultry ﬂocks was not embraced or supported. The response was
inadequate; effective daily monitoring and control of H7N9 among
poultry markedly lagged behind the dynamic geographical spread of
human cases. The response mounted was performed under the pretext
of “preserving local economic interests”; the economically-focused, pas-
sive responding patterns, however, drove continued transmission and
further outbreaks [12].
3. The next stage: a more proactive approach
EID events have risen since the early 1940s, peaking in the 1980s [2].
EIDs have a tendency to originate from lower-latitudes, particularly for
areas with poor reporting mechanisms, and it has been estimated that
~70% of EIDs are zoonotic. Areas such as Guangdong Province consti-
tute, by all measures, a high risk environment for the emergence of
novel and/or globally-relevant infectious diseases. Guangdong Province
is a major nexus for national and international commerce; densely pop-
ulated and located within the subtropics making it susceptible to
mosquito-borne diseases. It has already been the center of a number
of globally signiﬁcant outbreaks beyond SARS and H7N9, including
one of the largest epidemics of dengue fever seen in China [13]. EID sur-
veillance in China has undergone a revolution since the advent of SARS.
The Government has implemented a number of changes to EID detec-
tion and control and through this they have established systems that
are among the most efﬁcient worldwide. The changes implemented
by China in its approach to public health emergencies has been built
on four pillars [14]: (1) the development and implementation of effec-
tive legislation and contingency planning; (2) the establishment of an
effective command and coordination structure to facilitate cross-
sectorial response to emerging public health emergencies; (3) the de-
velopment of a highly effective notiﬁcation system for infectious dis-
eases and public health emergencies; and (4) the establishment of
professional public health emergency response teams. Once such exam-
ple of changes that have beenmade is the development the China Infec-
tious Disease Automated Alert and Response System (CIDARS). This
early warning system for EIDs, developed by the China CDC in 2008,
provides real-time reporting and automated analysis of data collected
through the electronic National Notiﬁable Infectious Diseases Reporting
Information System; any aberrant signal identiﬁed by the system is
passed on to CDCs at the county level by short message service [15].
The changes implemented by the Chinese government have undoubt-
edly improved response to EID events in China and should be recog-
nized for this. There is, however, a need not just for improved
surveillance for high risk areas such as Guangdong Province, but also
for a shift in thinking, away from the parochial approaches that have
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community, such as our veterinary colleagues and business, in order to
develop a comprehensive response; it requires recognition that just as
EIDs are driven bymany factors and compounded by the complex inter-
actions of these, they cannot be addressed exclusively from the human
health domain. Coordinating such an approach is difﬁcult, both politi-
cally and practically; the One Health approach, however, presents a
means to deal with such complexities.
One Health has been deﬁned “as the collaborative efforts of multiple
disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally, to attain optimal
health for people, animals, and our environment” [16]. The concept of
One Health is increasingly accepted as it presents themost comprehen-
sive approach to addressing a vast range of complex health problems,
not just at the point of effect, but also at the root cause of the problem
[17]. On November 2014, an International Symposium for One Health
Research was successfully held in Guangzhou, hosted by Sun Yat-sen
University, South China Agricultural University, State Key Laboratory
of Pathogen and Biosecurity and Duke University to promote One
Health practice in China and beyond. The symposium demonstrated
the utility of dynamic One Health approaches for use in EID surveillance
and response. There is a clear need for China to develop systems that can
better anticipate and respond to the emerging, complex public health
problems. We believe that One Health will emerge as the fourth devel-
opmental stage in China's public health system to ﬁll this need.
China is a country with unique challenges; it is a rapidly developing
country with a very large population and expanding economy. Through
this, China faces a number of complex challengeswith regards to health,
the economy and the environment. A number of infectious diseases of
signiﬁcant global concern have emerged from China over the past
20 years; many of which have been associated with production animals
or live animal markets. Despite this, response to EID events in China has
had a primary focus on human health and economic factors. It is becom-
ing apparent that such approaches do not adequately address the root
causes of the emergence of these diseases. EID events are highly com-
plex in nature and cannot be merely reduced to a simple “cause and ef-
fect” model; adequate response requires a broader perspective. It is
through this perspective that a One Health approach can be used to bet-
ter address emerging and complex health issues affecting China, such as
EIDs. One Health allows more proactive, systems based approaches to
be developed to address complex issues.
Whilst the One Health approach in concept, has been endorsed by a
number of signiﬁcant international organizations, including but not lim-
ited to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), WHO, United Na-
tions Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the World Bank [18],
there is still much work required if it is to be effectively implemented.
Adoption of a One Health approach in China has the potential to create
tension between stakeholders. Enacting change will require both lead-
ership and political will. Broadly, it will require action on four fronts:
legislation, communication, education and investment.
Firstly, legislation need to be strengthened for activities in non-
health sectors that are identiﬁed to contribute to the development and
spread of infectious diseases, such as farming practices, animal move-
ment and livestock markets. Such changes need to be supported with
positive and negative incentives to ensure compliance, such as compen-
sation for those adversely affected by shifts in practice and ﬁnes ormore
serious deterrents for those who are intentionally uncompliant. This
will require the development of a comprehensive understanding of
the motivations and needs of stakeholders.
Secondly, coordination during EID events needs to be improved
through enhanced communication capabilities. As has been discussed
above, China has made signiﬁcant progress with regards to transparen-
cy around EID events and in reporting of emerging situations to the
international community. Communication between governmentminis-
tries and between the public and private sectors, however, needs im-
provement. Namely, better mechanisms need to be developed forsharing of information related to EID events between departments
(such as the Department of Health, Department of Agriculture and De-
partment of Forestry), dissemination of reports (within China and to
the international community) and for linking of data.
Thirdly, One Health should be formally included in the curricula of
medical, veterinary, public health and epidemiology courses. Improved
understanding of the core principles of OneHealth by stakeholders is in-
strumental and currently appears lacking. Education opportunities,
such as workshops, conferences and professional development courses
needs to be developed. It is also imperative to recognize the need to ex-
tend education on the OneHealth approach beyond professionals in the
health sciences ﬁeld. Further efforts are required to educate all stake-
holders, from primary producers through to legislators.
Finally, these activities need to be supported with investment. In
order to successfully shift to a One Health approach investments are re-
quired in two key areas: research and implementation. Further research
is required into novel surveillance approaches for identifying and ad-
dressing EID events [19]. Findings, however, also need to be translated
to action, policy and practice. It is acknowledged, the successful imple-
mentation of a One Health system will require marked changes in the
status quo, and signiﬁcant investment. However, this shift has the po-
tential to signiﬁcantly improve EID surveillance and response in China
and beyond.
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